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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal of this study is to examine whether women in the highest levels of management 
ranks of firms help reduce barriers to advancement in the workplace faced by women.  
Using a panel of over 20,000 private-sector firms across all industries and states during 
1990-2003 from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, we explore the 
influence of women in top management on subsequent female representation in lower-
level managerial positions in U.S. firms.  Our key findings show that an increase in the 
share of female top managers is associated with subsequent increases in the share of 
women in mid-level management positions within firms, and this result is robust to 
controlling for firm size, workforce composition, federal contractor status, firm fixed 
effects, year fixed effects and industry-specific trends.  The influence of women in top 
management positions is stronger among federal contractors, in firms with larger female 
labor forces, and for white women. We also find that the positive influence of women in 
top leadership positions on managerial gender diversity diminishes over time, suggesting 
that women at the top play a positive but transitory role in women’s career advancement. 
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  INTRODUCTION 
Despite great advances in labor force participation and declines in both pay gaps 
and occupational segregation, women in the U.S. remain under-represented in managerial 
positions (Rothstein, 2001, Blau, Ferber and Winkler, 2006, pp. 181, Reskin and Bielby, 
2005).  While women have comprised around 45 percent of employment in large U.S. 
firms since the early 1990s, the proportion of women in managerial occupations was only 
29 percent in 1990, although this figure has been steadily increasing with 34 percent of 
management positions held by women in 2003 (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission).
1
  The goal of this study is to empirically examine whether women in the 
highest levels of management at firms help reduce barriers to advancement in the 
workplace faced by other women.   
It is often argued that women in top leadership positions of firms serve to improve 
women’s recruitment and promotion to managerial positions by mentoring women in 
lower-level jobs, acting as positive role models, and enhancing hiring and retention of 
women at the firm.  However, theories about whether gender diversity at high levels of 
firms’ hierarchies helps women advance have largely been based on anecdotal evidence 
and general observation due to the dearth of appropriate datasets conducive to an 
empirical analysis of this topic.  The few empirical studies which have examined the 
influence of women in top company leadership on subsequent managerial gender 
diversity have primarily been based on small samples of firms or workers involved in 
limited tasks, and often lack a longitudinal component.   
                                                 
1
  Nationally representative data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics confirm these trends: Current 
Population Survey estimates of the share of employed women aged 16 and over is steady around 45 percent 
during the 1990s while the share of employed women in management occupations in private sector firms 
(of all sizes) rises steadily from 33 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 2003. 
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This paper uses a unique panel of over 20,000 large private-sector firms across all 
industries and states during 1990-2003 obtained from the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission to study the influence of female top managers on the 
subsequent representation of women in mid-level management positions in U.S. firms, 
and how this relationship varies with firm characteristics such as industry and federal 
contractor status.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission firm reports create a 
unique opportunity to conduct a large-scale examination of this topic that until now has 
been mainly confined to empirical studies limited in size and generalizability. 
In addition to using a sample much larger in size and scope than previous studies 
on the topic, our study is also the first to exploit panel methods to identify the influence 
of female top mangers on subsequent managerial gender diversity, allowing us to derive 
more precise estimates of this relationship.  Though detecting the influence of women top 
managers is difficult in the absence of exogenous variation in female representation in the 
highest ranks of firm hierarchies, we are able to control for numerous sources of 
heterogeneity in our panel regressions that threaten the identification of the women top 
managers effect, including time-varying observed firm heterogeneity, time-invariant 
unobserved firm heterogeneity, and industry-specific and economy-wide trends that may 
additionally affect the evolution of female managerial representation at firms.   
Our key findings show that an increase in the share of female top managers is 
associated with subsequent further increases in the share of women in mid-level 
management, and this result is robust to controlling for firm size, workforce composition, 
federal contractor status, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects and industry-specific time 
trends.  We also find that the positive influence of female top managers on managerial 
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gender diversity diminishes over time.  These results suggest that women in the highest 
leadership positions play a positive but transitory role in women’s career advancement in 
U.S. firms. 
 
MECHANISMS 
Why might we expect greater representation of women in top leadership positions 
to lead to subsequent increases in managerial gender diversity at the firm?  One potential 
mechanism is mentoring (Athey, Avery and Zemsky, 2000).  Women managers may act 
as mentors to female employees in lower ranks of the firm’s hierarchy, actively training 
them in firm-specific human capital and skills necessary to succeed at the firm thereby 
improving the likelihood that they will get promoted to top managerial positions—an 
advantage male employees have long benefited from given historically male-dominated 
management at firms (Kanter, 1977, Ibarra, 1993, Noe, 1988).  
Furthermore, if it is the case that female employees are given less favorable 
performance evaluations by male supervisors than by female supervisors --either because 
of gender discrimination in supervisor evaluations (both taste-based and statistical 
discrimination) or because women perform worse when working under male managers 
than female managers--and are thus less likely to be promoted to higher positions (Tsui 
and O’Reilly, 1989; Giuliano, Leonard and Levine, 2006), then women employees would 
be more likely to be promoted in firms with a greater share of women at the top.   
There have been a few empirical studies examining the relationship between the 
share of women in top management and internal promotions of women employees within 
firms, and the overall evidence is mixed.  Chused (1988) found that women law 
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professors were more likely to be granted tenure in faculties with a higher proportion of 
tenured women than in faculties with a very low proportion of tenured women in their 
sample of 149 U.S. law schools. Using data on managerial workers at 333 savings and 
loan banks in California, Cohen, Broschak and Haveman (1998) found that women were 
more likely to be promoted into a managerial job level when a higher proportion of 
women were already there.  On the other hand, Blau and DeVaro (2007) found no 
evidence of this in their cross-section of 1,772 urban establishments in Atlanta, Boston, 
Detroit and Los Angeles from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, and Rothstein 
(1997) found no evidence of differences in subjective perceptions of future promotion 
probabilities based on supervisor gender among young workers in the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth.   
Another channel through which women in top leadership may play an influential 
role in increasing subsequent managerial gender diversity at the firm is by recruiting 
highly qualified women from other firms to managerial positions at the firm.  For 
example, Cohen, Broschak and Haveman (1998) found increased external recruitment of 
female managers when there were more preexisting female managers in their sample of 
333 California savings and loan banks.  Company executives often socialize with 
executives from other firms and these networks are commonly divided along gender 
lines.  So it is more likely that female top managers will be more knowledgeable than 
male top managers about women at outside firms who may be suitable for a managerial 
opening at the firm.  In other words, women top managers can improve female 
recruitment using their female networks and informing women outside the firm of 
managerial job opportunities.  
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In addition to recruiting qualified females directly to the managerial positions of 
the firm, women in top leadership may increase the recruitment of women to lower-level 
non-managerial positions in the firm, thereby increasing the likelihood of female internal 
promotions to managerial positions.  A limited number of studies have documented 
greater external hiring of female non-managerial employees when management was 
comprised of a higher female share (Carrington and Troske, 1995 and 1998).  Huffman 
et. al (2010) show that increased women in management jobs is associated with declines 
in workplace sex segregation. 
Apart from increasing the probability of female promotions through increasing the 
proportion of female non-managers, women managers may utilize their female networks 
to recruit higher quality female non-managers, which will also lead to higher female 
internal promotions to managerial positions for a given proportion of female non-
managers at the firm. 
In addition to improved female recruitment, women in top leadership can 
facilitate growth in female managerial representation through improving retention, both 
of existing female non-managers and managers.  For instance, Giuliano, Leonard and 
Levine (2006) found that female employees demonstrated lower quit rates working under 
female supervisors than under male supervisors at a large U.S. retail chain. 
 The above mechanisms are ways in which female top managers may actively 
increase the subsequent share of women in mid-level management positions at the firm.  
However, women top managers may also indirectly improve gender diversity in the 
managerial ranks of the firm.   
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First, women who have attained visibility in top positions of the corporate 
hierarchy may weaken traditional stereotypes claiming female managers are less capable 
than male managers, thereby weakening a formidable barrier to the advancement of 
women in the workplace (Blau, Ferber and Winkler, 2006, pp. 179-91).  This can make it 
more difficult for discriminatory employers to implement taste-based discrimination in 
hiring and promotion of women to managerial positions (Becker, 1957).  It can also lower 
statistical discrimination in hiring and promotion of women to managerial positions 
(Phelps, 1972, Arrow, 1973, Aigner and Cain, 1977).  Theories of statistical and taste-
based discrimination also suggest that discriminatory employers will be less likely to hire 
women to jobs that have long promotion ladders or occupations that lead to eventual 
company management, so the weakening of stereotypes regarding women’s ability to 
effectively manage are also likely to reduce discrimination of this form.  Furthermore, 
theories of the signaling role of promotions suggest that the improved information 
regarding female managerial ability due to a greater salience of women in top leadership 
positions in the labor market will increase the likelihood that a woman will be promoted 
to managerial jobs from lower levels since the promoting firm will be less concerned 
about revealing information about the productivity of the promoted female to competing 
firms (Milgrom and Oster, 1987, DeVaro and Waldman, 2009). 
 Second, female top managers can act as role models to female employees at lower 
levels of the firm hierarchy without actually mentoring them.  In a series of qualitative 
interviews and questionnaires of attorneys at U.S. law firms, Ely (1994) found that junior 
women associates with few senior women partners were less likely to view senior women 
as role models than at firms with many senior women.  Further, the presence of a large 
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share of female top managers can serve as a signal to lower-level female managerial 
employees at the firm that rising through the firm’s ranks is feasible and hence motivate 
lower-level female employees to put forth more effort in hopes of eventually attaining 
promotion to top management ranks.  The presence of a large share of female top 
managers may also serve as an external signal that the firm provides a hospitable 
environment for women to succeed and attain the high wages associated with those 
positions and this may attract highly qualified female applicants, both to managerial and 
non-managerial openings.  The gender gap in wages among both managers and non-
managers has been shown to be lower in firms with more women at the highest levels of 
firms (Bell, 2005, Hultin and Szulkin, 1999, Shenhav and Haberfeld, 1992), and this is 
also likely to attract highly qualified female applicants. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The firm-level data we use in our empirical analyses come from confidential 
annual EEO-1 reports from 1990 to 2003 that have been collected by the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission as mandated by Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, and describe the occupation, race and gender composition of employees 
across all U.S. private-sector firms with 100 or more employees and private-sector 
federal contractors with 50 or more employees.  We have records on more than 20,000 
firms over the 1990-2003 period.  Furthermore, a great advantage of these data is their 
longitudinal nature, allowing us to follow firms over time and thereby enabling us to use 
panel regression methods to control for unobserved attributes of firms that may be 
correlated with female managerial representation and derive sharper econometric 
estimates of the effects being studied.  Firms are observed for 7.1 years on average.  
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Finally, to our knowledge the EEO-1 records comprise the only available cross-firm 
database with information on employee gender and race composition by occupational 
category at the firm.   
EEO-1 reports contain employment counts at each firm by gender of five race or 
ethnic groups (White, Black, Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander, American Indian or 
Alaskan Native) distributed across the following nine occupational categories: Managers 
and Officers, Professionals, Technicians, Sales Workers, Office and Clerical Workers, 
Craft Workers, Operatives, Laborers, and Service Workers.  Specifically, the  Managers 
and Officers category is defined as administrative and managerial personnel who set 
broad policies, exercise overall responsibility for execution of these policies, and direct 
individual departments or special phases of the firm’s operations.  Examples of jobs in 
the Managers and Officers category include executives, plant managers, department 
managers, superintendents, and managing supervisors.  Within the occupational category 
of Managers and Officers, we are able to distinguish between top managers working at 
firm headquarters with control over broad firm policy and firm-wide visibility, and 
middle managers working at the firm’s non-headquarter establishments.   
When filing their EEO-1 forms, firms are instructed not to include temporary or 
casual employees hired for a specified period of time or for the duration of a specified job 
in their reports but to include leased employees as well as both part-time and full-time 
employees.  Robinson et. al. (2005) compare employment covered in the EEO-1 data to 
employment estimates from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and report EEO-1 
coverage to be about 40 percent of all U.S. private-sector employment through the 1990s, 
with higher proportions in industries comprised of larger firms such as manufacturing and 
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transportation.  The EEO-1 reports also include information on the firm’s industry, 
geographic location, whether or not the firm is a federal contractor, and whether or not 
the firm is a multi-establishment organization.  A complete description of these data can 
be found in Robinson et. al. (2005).   
We estimate fixed effects regressions of the relationship between the share of 
women top-level managers at a given firm in the past and the share of women mid-level 
managers in the future of the following form: 


 
n
j
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for specifications with incrementally more lags of Pctfemtopmanager on the right hand 
side, i.e., n = {0,1,2,3,4,5}.  Here, ti ,  is a vector that includes a constant term and an 
array of time-varying firm i year t controls, defined below, i  is a firm fixed effect, t  is 
a year fixed effect, and Industryi*t  represents industry-specific time trends (dummy 
variables indicating firm i’s industry interacted with a linear time trend).     
Our goal in this paper is to estimate the influence of women top managers on 
subsequent female representation in middle management at the firm net of economy-wide 
and firm-specific factors that may also be influencing the evolution of female 
representation in mid-level management.  Including firm fixed effects in Equation (1) 
allows us to control for time-invariant unobserved firm attributes which may influence 
the future share of women in middle-management, such as stable human resource 
policies.  Furthermore, we include year fixed effects to control for any economy-wide 
shocks and general trends affecting the evolution of female managerial representation 
symmetrically across all firms.  However, there may also be factors influencing the share 
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of women mid-level managers that vary within the firm and the firm’s industry over time 
which would bias our estimates of the influence of women top managers on subsequent 
female representation in mid-level management if such factors do not change at a 
national level uniformly and get picked up by the year fixed effects in our model 
(McTague et. al. 2009).  We would therefore like to additionally control for such firm-
specific and industry-specific factors that may also be serving to increase the share of 
women middle managers at the firm over time.  A very flexible way to do this would be 
to incorporate firm-specific trends ( i *t) into Equation (1), but this is not feasible given 
the large number of firms in our sample.  Instead, we incorporate interactions of industry 
dummies with a linear time trend to account for industry-specific trends in the prevalence 
of women in mid-level management positions.  For example, many firms in a particular 
line of business or industry may react to a high-profile gender discrimination lawsuit 
against a similar firm by enacting a policy of increasing the share of women managers in 
mid-level management over a period of time.  Including industry-specific time trends 
allows us to control for such phenomena so that we can get more accurate estimates of 
the firm-level influence of women top managers on subsequent representation of women 
middle managers net of any industry trends toward higher levels of managerial gender 
diversity. 
 Our study is the first to exploit panel methods to investigate the role played by 
women in top leadership positions at firms in increasing overall managerial gender 
diversity.  One previous study, Cohen et al. (1998) analyzed 333 California savings and 
loan banks and found that both external hiring and upward mobility by women into 
management was facilitated by preexisting women managers, however, despite having 
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collected yearly data on managers at these banks over the period 1975 to 1987, they 
pooled all observations across all years and banks and estimated logistic regressions of 
the probability of a managerial job being filled by a woman given the current 
composition of employment at the bank without accounting for any worker, firm or year 
fixed effects.  Our regressions, on the other hand, control for numerous sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity in order to more precisely quantify the influence of women top 
managers on the subsequent representation of women in firms’ mid-level management 
ranks.  Furthermore, the Cohen et. al. study is both geographically and industrially 
specific and so leaves open the question of the generality of this phenomenon, while our 
study is based on a longitudinal sample of over 20,000 firms covering a much broader 
geographic and industry scope.
2
   
Even after accounting for firm fixed effects, year fixed effects and industry-
specific trends, there may still remain differences across firms in factors such as firm 
culture or diversity policy that vary over time within firms and that influence the 
evolution of female managerial representation at the firm, biasing our estimates of the 
effect of women top managers on subsequent managerial gender diversity.  To alleviate 
this potential source of bias, we additionally control for a set of observable time-varying 
firm characteristics that are likely to be correlated with unobservable factors like firm 
culture or the intensity with which diversity policies are implemented at the firm and that 
are likely to influence the extent to which women in top managerial positions can help 
reduce barriers to advancement in the workplace faced by other women.  
                                                 
2
  Because Cohen et. al. did not provide marginal effects, we are not able to compare the magnitudes of our 
estimates to theirs. 
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Previous research has shown that firms with formalized human resource practices 
such as formal job titles, vacancy postings and standardized employee evaluations have 
lower occupational segregation, lower wage gaps and higher female access to jobs at the 
top of firm hierarchies (Elvira and Graham, 2002, Konrad and Linnehan, 1995, Reskin 
and McBrier, 2000), and that the formalization of human resource practices is correlated 
with organizational size and complexity (Marsden, Cook and Kalleberg, 1996).  We 
therefore control for firm size. 
It is reasonable to expect that gender diversity in the non-managerial ranks at the 
firm may influence the extent to which women top managers can attract more women 
into mid-level management positions in the future.  The most obvious reason for this is 
that the greater the percentage of women in non-managerial positions, the greater is the 
probability that women will be promoted from lower levels to mid-level managerial 
positions.  It is also possible that when women have a large share of employment at the 
firm, the firm may be more likely to promote women to mid-level managerial positions to 
motivate its lower-level female employees.  Furthermore, there might be less resistance to 
increasing the share of women in management overall when there are many non-
managerial women at the firm.  Reskin and McBrier (2000), in their analysis of 516 
employers from the 1991 National Organizations Study, showed that the higher women’s 
share of jobs in an establishment, the higher the proportion of female managers.  
Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey (2009) also found women’s representation in 
management to be closely linked to their representation in non-managerial occupations in 
their analysis of EEOC private sector data.  In a series of experimental studies on 
cognitive psychological processes and unconscious biases reviewed in Valian (1998, pp. 
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139-44), women’s performance ratings were more negative than men’s when women 
comprised smaller percentages within teams.  We therefore also control for the share of 
non-managerial employees at the firm who are women in our regressions. 
It is also reasonable to expect that firms which actively implement race diversity 
policies are more likely to give high priority to implementing gender diversity programs 
as well.  We therefore also include as controls the share of black and Hispanic employees 
at the firm to account for idiosyncratic variation across firms in the implementation 
intensity of managerial gender diversity policies.  Furthermore, our models control for the 
share of employees who are managers to account for the difficulty of attaining 
managerial positions at the firm.  
  We also control for federal contractor status in all of our regression analyses.  
Firms with government contracts are subject to compliance reviews by the Office of 
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP), with penalties for non-compliance ranging from 
revocation of current government contracts to suspension of the right to bid on future 
contracts.  Firms that are government contractors may therefore be more likely to 
implement their diversity programs with greater intensity.  They are also required to take 
affirmative action in recruiting and promoting women and minorities as mandated by 
Executive Order no. 11246 of 1965.  In his analysis of EEO-1 records for the period 
1974-1980, Leonard (1984a, 1984b, 1986) found that federal contractors increased the 
employment shares of women and minorities significantly faster than non-contractors and 
that the occupational advancement of minority groups into skilled white-collar work was 
more rapid within contracting than non-contracting establishments.  Ashenfelter and 
Heckman (1976) used EEO-1 records for the period 1966-1970 to show that employment 
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of black males relative to white males increased more rapidly in firms with government 
contracts than in firms without contracts, and Heckman and Wolpin (1976) found a 
similar result based on their analysis of EEO-1 records of firms in the Chicago 
metropolitan area for the period 1970-1973.  Brown (1982) also concluded, from a 
review of the literature, that the employment shares of protected groups increased more 
rapidly among contractors than non-contractors.  Konrad and Linnehan (1995) found that 
being a government contractor was positively associated with management attitudes 
about the importance of the company reputation in the area of equal employment 
opportunity and also positively associated with the percentage of women in high-level 
management and the percentage of women employees, and Kalev and Dobbin (2006) 
found that OFCCP compliance reviews had a positive but declining effect on white 
female and black access to managerial jobs since the 1970s. 
Below we define the variables used in our empirical analysis and Table 1 presents 
summary statistics for these variables.  Figure 1 shows trends in the percentage of 
women, women managers, women top managers, women middle managers, and women 
non-managers over the years 1990 to 2003. 
Variable Definitions 
Pctfemmanager Percentage of managers at the firm who are female 
Pctfemtopmanager Percentage of top managers at firm headquarters who are female 
Pctfemmidmanager Percentage of middle managers at non-headquarter establishments of the firm who are female 
Lnsize Ln(number of employees at the firm) 
Fed Dummy variable equaling 1 if the firm is a federal contractor, 0 otherwise 
Pctblk Percentage of employees at the firm who are black 
Pcthisp Percentage of employees at the firm who are Hispanic 
Pctfemnonmanager Percentage of non-managerial employees at the firm who are female 
Pctmanager Percentage of employees at the firm who are managers 
Year dummies (1990-2003) Dummy variable indicating year (1990-2003) 
Industry-Specific Time Trends  (9):  
Agriculture*Trend (Dummy variable equaling 1 if the industry of the firm is agriculture)*(Linear time trend)  
Mining*Trend (Dummy variable equaling 1 if the industry of the firm is mining)*(Linear time trend) 
Construction*Trend (Dummy variable equaling 1 if the industry of the firm is construction)*(Linear time trend) 
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Manufacturing*Trend (Dummy variable equaling 1 if the industry of the firm is manufacturing)*(Linear time trend) 
Transportation*Trend (Dummy variable equaling 1 if the industry of the firm is transportation)*(Linear time trend) 
Wholesale*Trend (Dummy variable equaling 1 if the industry of the firm is wholesale trade)*(Linear time trend) 
Retail*Trend (Dummy variable equaling 1 if the industry of the firm is retail trade)*(Linear time trend) 
Finance*Trend (Dummy variable equaling 1 if the industry of the firm is finance)*(Linear time trend) 
Service*Trend (Dummy variable equaling 1 if the industry of the firm is services)*(Linear time trend) 
 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In order to determine whether top-level women managers have a positive 
influence on subsequent mid-level female managerial representation, we estimate fixed 
effects regressions of the share of female top managers at firm i in year t on the share of 
female managers at firm i in year t and in the previous five years t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4 and t-5, 
and the full set of controls including firm size, whether the firm is a federal contractor, 
the share of employees at the firm who are black or Hispanic, and the share of non-
managerial employees at the firm who are female, the share of management at the firm, 
year dummies, and industry-specific trends.  The estimates from this model are reported 
in Table 2, and as seen in Columns 1 through 6 of Table 2, the coefficient estimates are 
remarkably stable as we incrementally add older lags of the shares of top women 
managers to the right hand side of the empirical specification.  The estimates reveal a 
positive relationship between the share of female top managers at the firm in the past and 
the share of women in mid-level management in the future.  Focusing on the specification 
in the last column with concurrent and five lags of female top manager shares and the full 
set of firm controls, year indicators, and industry-specific trends, we see that the 
coefficient on the concurrent percentage of female mid-level managers is 0.017 and 
statistically significant at the one percent level.  The coefficient on the percentage of 
female middle managers in year t-1 is even larger, 0.024, and significant.  The 
coefficients on older lags are also positive and significant, and gradually become smaller 
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in magnitude.
3
  Note that another way to interpret the results in the last column of Table 2 
is that a one percentage point increase in the share women in top-level management this 
year is associated with a 0.017 percentage point increase in the share of female middle 
managers in the same year, a 0.024 percentage point increase in the next year, a 0.020 
percentage point increase two years later, a 0.009 percentage point increase three years 
later, a 0.011 percentage point increase four years later, and a 0.008 percentage point 
increase five years later.  These amount to a six-year cumulative increase of 0.088 
percentage points in the share of female middle managers.
4
   
We infer from these results that women in top management have the greatest 
impact on women’s advancement to the mid-level managerial ranks of firms after one 
year but the effect gradually weakens in later years.  A possible explanation for the 
diminishing effect is that women may exit the firm to take up better jobs elsewhere after 
several years of serving in mid-level managerial positions at the firm and the positions 
they vacate are statistically more likely to be filled by men; as seen in Table 1 the 
probability that a mid-level managerial position will be filled by a man is over 70 percent.  
We conclude that women top managers help women advance but the positive impact of 
an increase in the share of women top managers slowly tapers off over the years.
5
 
                                                 
3
 The coefficient on the contemporaneous share of female top managers is likely smaller than the t-1 
coefficient because an expansion in the share of top managers is will be in part due to promotion of women 
from middle management ranks (thus shrinking women’s middle management share in the 
contemporaneous period). 
4
  We also estimated models with the lagged versions of the time-varying firm control variables; the 
estimates of the coefficients on the main independent variables remain nearly identical to those reported in 
Table 2.  This is also true for all of the models in the remainder of the paper.  These results are available 
from the authors. 
5
  Our focus is on regressions of the share of female middle managers on the share of female top managers 
rather than the other way around since, as we have argued throughout the paper, the channels of influence 
are most likely to flow from higher levels to lower levels in the firm’s hierarchy through mechanisms like 
mentoring of lower level employees, hiring and retention.  However, we also explored the reverse 
specification by estimating analogous fixed effects regressions of the share of female top managers on the 
share of female middle managers.  The estimated coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged shares of 
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ADDITIONAL  RESULTS 
 In this section we pursue a number of extensions to the main empirical analysis.  
In particular, we explore asymmetries in the impact of female top managers upon the 
evolution of gender diversity in mid-level management by firm federal contractor status, 
industry, and the percentage of female non-managers already working at the firm.  We 
also examine whether the influence of female top managers varies by race of top 
managers. 
Federal Contractor Status 
Does the influence of female top managers on the subsequent representation of 
women in middle management vary depending on whether the firm is a federal 
contractor?  As explained in the last section, firms with government contracts are 
required to take affirmative action in recruiting and promoting women and minorities and 
are potentially subject to OFCCP reviews, and previous empirical work has found that the 
increase in employment shares and occupational advancement of protected groups was 
more rapid among federal contractors than non-contractors during the initial years of the 
Civil Rights movement.  Given these regulatory pressures, it is reasonable to suspect that 
women in top leadership may be better able to expand managerial gender diversity at 
firms with government contracts in comparison to non-contractors.  We test this 
hypothesis by augmenting the most controlled regression specification presented in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
female middle managers were either statistically indistinguishable from zero or considerably smaller than 
the estimates from our main specifications discussed above, showing that the direction of influence is from 
top management to middle management and not the other way around.  These results are available from the 
authors. 
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last columns of Table 2 with interactions of the current and lagged shares of women top 
managers with current federal contractor status.
6
   
The estimates from this model are presented in Table 3, with the lower panel 
showing the marginal effects of women in top management at firms holding federal 
contracts versus non-contractors.  It is interesting to note that among non-contractors, the 
influence of woman top managers can be characterized as more of a short-term 
phenomenon, with most of the statistically significant female top manager effects 
concentrated in the current and early periods, while at federal contractors there are more 
sustained, longer-term effects as indicated by the fact that the coefficient on later lags 
(lags one, two three and four) are also strongly statistically significant.  This suggests that 
affirmative action in contracting extends the persistence of the positive effect of women 
in top leadership, perhaps because women in top leadership also influence contractors’ 
formal affirmative action plans to expand managerial gender diversity.  Moreover, we 
also see in the lower panel of Table 3 that the six-year cumulative effect of women top 
managers is slightly larger among contractors, providing further support that the idea that 
women top managers are better able to expand female managerial representation at firms 
with government contracts in comparison to non-contractors. 
Industry 
A unique advantage of the EEO-1 data is that they include firms across all 
industries of the United States.  Since women’s representation, gender norms, and 
occupational segregation by gender vary a great deal across industries, the positive 
                                                 
6
  We also estimated models in which the interaction terms were with one period lagged federal contractor 
status, five year lagged federal contractor status, federal contractor status concurrent with the lag of the 
share of female managers, and an indicator of whether the firm was a federal contractor in each of the 
previous five years.  The results are very similar to those reported here, and are available from the authors. 
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influence of women in top leadership is likely to be more intense for certain industries 
than for others.  We explore this idea in Table 4 by restricting the regression analysis to 
samples consisting of firms in each of the following industries: agriculture, mining, 
construction, manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, and the 
service industry.  There is considerable variation in the impact of women top managers 
on subsequent female representation in mid-level management.  Focusing on the six-year 
cumulative effect, firms in the construction, manufacturing, finance and wholesale trade 
industries tend to exhibit the largest benefits to female managers.  Interestingly some of 
these are also industries in which women have historically been underrepresented relative 
to men and therefore where the benefits of women managers on increasing recruitment, 
retention and promotion of women may be expected to be large.  On the other hand, firms 
in the agriculture and mining industries exhibit the weakest effects. 
Non-Managerial Gender Diversity 
It is reasonable to expect that gender diversity in the non-managerial ranks at the 
firm may influence the extent to which women top managers can attract more women 
into mid-level managerial positions in the future, perhaps because the greater the 
percentage of women in non-managerial positions the greater is the probability that 
women will be promoted from lower levels to middle management positions, or because 
when women have a large share of employment at the firm the firm may be more likely 
to promote women to management ranks to motivate its lower-level female employees, or 
because there may be less resistance to increasing managerial gender diversity when there 
are many non-managerial women at the firm.  We test this hypothesis by including 
interactions of the share of non-managerial employees who are female with the current 
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and lagged shares of female top managers in the baseline regression of the share of 
female middle managers on the current and lagged shares of female top managers.  
Estimates from this regression are presented in Table 5, with the lower panel showing the 
implied marginal effects of the share of female top managers on subsequent female mid-
level managerial representation computed at different shares of female non-managerial 
workers at the firm.  Reading across rows in the lower panel, we see that the short-term 
benefits of female top managers (current and first lag) are increasing with the share of 
female non-managers at the firm, suggesting that indeed women top managers can more 
effectively diversify management ranks when women’s overall firm presence is larger.  
Similarly, the six-year cumulative effect of women in top leadership is increasing with 
the share of non-managerial women.  On the other hand, the longer-term benefits of 
women top managers (lags two, three, four and five) are either decreasing with the share 
of female non-managers or not statistically significant. 
Race of Women Managers 
A potential objection to the results presented so far is that the revealed positive 
effect of women managers may represent only a white women manager effect.  This, 
however, turns out not to be the case.  Despite the fact that the incidence of non-white 
female top managers is much lower than the incidence of white female top managers in 
any given year during 1990-2003 (Table 6), we find that black, Hispanic and Asian 
female top managers in fact have a positive and statistically significant influence on 
expanding the subsequent representation of black, Hispanic and Asian women in middle 
management as do white female top managers have on expanding the subsequent 
representation of white women in middle management.  As seen in Table 7 Panel B, a 
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one percentage point increase in the share of black female top managers at the firm is 
associated with a statistically significant 0.022 percentage point further increase in the 
share of black female middle managers in the following year, and a 0.034 percentage 
point further increase in the share of black female middle managers after five years.  As 
seen in Panels C and D of Table 7, a one percentage point increase in the share of 
Hispanic female top managers is associated with a 0.027 percentage point further 
increase in the share of Hispanic women middle managers after two years, and a one 
percentage point increase in the share of Asian female top managers is associated with a 
0.016 percentage point further increase in the share of Asian women middle managers 
after five years.  Note that the estimated relationships between the contemporaneous 
shares of minority female top managers and middle managers are generally negative, 
probably because an expansion in minority female top managers is likely to be due to 
promotion of minority women from middle management ranks (thus shrinking their 
middle management share in the contemporaneous period).  Although the relationship 
between black, Hispanic and Asian women in top management and subsequent increases 
in black, Hispanic and Asian women in middle management is quite a bit smaller than the 
relationship between white female top managers and subsequent increases in white 
female middle management revealed in Panel A, there are clear effects for black, 
Hispanic and Asian women, indicating that the average effects revealed earlier in the 
paper were not merely a white women managers phenomenon.
7,8
  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
                                                 
7
  We also estimated cross-race regressions of the influence of white women in top management on 
minority women in middle management.  For black and Hispanic women the influence was weakly 
positive, and for Asian and Native American women the impact was essentially zero.  
8
  Additionally including a control variable for the percentage of non-managerial workers belonging to the 
relevant race does not change the regression estimates very much. 
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Using a unique panel of over 20,000 large private-sector firms across all 
industries and states during 1990-2003 from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, we show that female top managers have a positive influence on expanding 
the subsequent representation of women in the lower-level managerial ranks of U.S. 
firms, and this result is robust to controlling for firm size, workforce composition, 
industry, geographic location, federal contractor status, firm fixed effects, year fixed 
effects and industry-specific time trends.  Further, the influence of women top managers 
on gender diversity in lower-levels of management diminishes over time.  Our findings 
collectively suggest that women in top management play a positive but transitory role in 
the advancement of women within U.S. firms.   
We additionally uncover interesting differences in the effect of women top 
managers on the evolution of managerial gender diversity by federal contractor status, 
industry, managerial race, and the proportion of female non-managers already working at 
the firm.  For example, the positive effect of women in top leadership positions is found 
to be more persistent at firms holding federal contracts and thereby bound by affirmative 
action obligation, than at non-contractors. 
Our analysis reveals that an increase in the share of women in top leadership leads 
to subsequent further growth in managerial gender diversity at firms -- but how does the 
initial increase in the share of women top managers come about?  What are the 
exogenous influences that begin this process?  Our analysis does not address how women 
can make initial inroads into top management that will lead to further increases in 
managerial gender diversity, but highlights the potential importance of external 
intervention (e.g., positive and negative press coverage, lawsuits) and government 
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regulation in bringing about such initial inroads for women in top levels of company 
hierarchies.  As Athey et. al (2000, pp. 765) point out, a firm may have multiple steady 
states for female managerial representation whereby temporary affirmative-action 
policies may have a long-run impact on the evolution of diversity at the firm by moving 
the firm to a steady state characterized by greater female managerial representation. 
Future work might involve a formal analysis of the mechanisms through which 
women in top leadership positions expand managerial gender diversity.  A limitation of 
the EEO-1 database is that it does not contain information on promotions, hiring, 
turnover, or mentoring of female employees relative to men, preventing us from 
determining which of these different channels of influence are the predominant 
mechanisms underlying our main results.  It would be useful to investigate the relative 
strengths of these various mechanisms using more detailed datasets in future research. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of Females, Percentage of Female Managers, Percentage of Female Top Managers, 
Percentage of Female Middle Managers, Percentage of Female Non-managers, All Industries, 1990-2003 
 
 
Source:  U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission EEO-1 Reports. 
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Pctfemmanager 0.318 0.225 0 1 121,467 
Pctfemtopmanager 0.303 0.212 0 1 121,467 
Pctfemmidmanager 0.322 0.283 0 1 121,467 
Lnsize 6.403 1.361 3.912 13.990 121,467 
Fed 0.492 0.499 0 1 121,467 
Multi 0.609 0.488 0 1 121,467 
Pctblk 0.108 0.127 0 1 121,467 
Pcthisp 0.089 0.133 0 1 121,467 
Pctfemnonmanager 0.470 0.253 0 1 121,467 
Pctmanager 0.132 0.077 0 1 121,467 
Year dummies (1990-2003)     0 1 121,467 
Industry-Specific Trends (9)     0 14 121,467 
Note:  Based on the sample of N = 121,467 firm-years used in the baseline regression model 
presented in the last column of Table 2.  
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TALBE 2:  Relationship Between Percentage of Female Middle Managers and Lagged Percentage of Female Top Managers (Fixed 
Effects Estimates) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Pctfemmidmanager 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pctfemtopmanager 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag1  0.031*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag2   0.023*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag3    0.013*** 0.009** 0.009** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag4     0.013*** 0.011** 
     (0.004) (0.004) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag5      0.008* 
      (0.004) 
Lnsize 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Fed -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Pctblk 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Pcthisp 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.030 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Pctfemnonmanager 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Pctmanager 0.250*** 0.248*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry-Specific Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Observations 121467 121467 121467 121467 121467 121467 
Number of Firms 22885 22885 22885 22885 22885 22885 
Adjusted R-squared 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.021 
Note:  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Six-year 
cumulative effect 
of a one 
percentage point 
increase: 
0.088*** 
(0.013) 
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TABLE 3:  How the Relationship Between Percentage of Female Middle Managers and Lagged Percentage of Female Top Managers 
Varies with Federal Contractor Status (Fixed Effects Estimates) 
 
Panel A: Regression Estimates 
 
 Dependent Variable: Pctfemmidmanager 
Pctfemtopmanager 0.025*** 
 (0.008) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag1 0.018*** 
 (0.006) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag2 0.019*** 
 (0.006) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag3 0.005 
 (0.006) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag4 0.006 
 (0.006) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag5 0.012* 
 (0.006) 
PctfemtopmanagerXfed -0.019* 
 (0.010) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag1Xfed 0.014 
 (0.009) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag2Xfed 0.000 
 (0.009) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag3Xfed 0.010 
 (0.008) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag4Xfed 0.012 
 (0.008) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag5Xfed -0.010 
 (0.008) 
Constant 0.051*** 
 (0.017) 
Observations 121467 
Number of Firms 22885 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021 
Note: The model includes the full set of firm controls, year dummies and industry-specific trends as listed in the last column of Table 
2.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
 
Panel B:  Implied Marginal Effects
                                                Implied Effect on Pctfemmidmanager 
 For Fed=0 
Firms 
For Fed=1 
Firms 
Pctfemtopmanager  
 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag1 0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.032*** 
(0.007) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag2 0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag3 0.005 
(0.006) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag4 0.006 
(0.006) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag5 0.012*  
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
Six-year Cumulative Effect 0.085*** 
(0.014) 
0.091*** 
(0.013) 
(Six-year Effect for Fed=1 
Firms) – (Six-year Effect for 
Fed=0 firms) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
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TABLE 4:  How the Relationship Between Percentage of Female Middle Managers and Lagged Percentage of Female Top Managers 
Varies by Industry (Fixed Effects Regressions by Industry)  
 
 Dependent Variable: Pctfemmidmanager 
 agriculture mining construction manufacturing transportation wholesale retail finance service 
Pctfemtopmanager -0.087 0.032 0.067** 0.000 0.006 -0.024 0.010 -0.007 0.044*** 
 (0.077) (0.036) (0.028) (0.012) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag1 -0.067 0.002 0.066** 0.007 0.012 0.054*** 0.014 0.050*** 0.023** 
 (0.064) (0.024) (0.026) (0.009) (0.018) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag2 -0.064 -0.002 0.001 0.022** 0.031* 0.020 0.021** 0.006 0.022** 
 (0.048) (0.020) (0.026) (0.009) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag3 0.014 -0.031 0.031 0.028** -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.017* 0.003 
 (0.043) (0.026) (0.020) (0.011) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag4 0.144 0.010 -0.003 0.010 -0.013 0.035*** -0.003 0.024** 0.007 
 (0.110) (0.023) (0.020) (0.009) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag5 0.181 0.022 -0.009 0.020** 0.000 0.007 -0.003 0.007 0.004 
 (0.118) (0.025) (0.029) (0.009) (0.016) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
Constant -0.489*** -0.140** 0.061 -0.106*** -0.066 -0.106** 0.052 0.208*** 0.214*** 
 (0.183) (0.054) (0.060) (0.028) (0.048) (0.042) (0.062) (0.060) (0.039) 
Six-year Cumulative 
Effect 
0.122 
(0.206) 
0.033 
(0.055) 
0.153** 
(0.068) 
0.087*** 
(0.028) 
0.036 
(0.047) 
0.092*** 
(0.036) 
0.036 
(0.030) 
0.097*** 
(0.030) 
0.103*** 
(0.026) 
Observations 735 1114 2921 34293 6912 11061 12374 18496 33561 
Adjusted R-squared 0.093 0.069 0.047 0.024 0.028 0.034 0.060 0.028 0.010 
Number of Firms 129 198 562 6235 1324 1999 2339 3491 6608 
Note: Each model includes the full set of firm controls, year dummies and industry-specific trends as listed in the last column of Table 2.  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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TABLE 5:  How the Relationship Between Percentage of Female Middle Managers and Lagged Percentage of Female Top Managers 
Varies by Percentage of Female Nonmanagers (Fixed Effects Estimates) 
 
Panel A:  Regression Estimates 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
Pctfemmidmanager 
Pctfemtopmanager 0.014 
 (0.010) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag1 0.014 
 (0.009) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag2 0.030*** 
 (0.008) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag3 0.011 
 (0.008) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag4 0.007 
 (0.008) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag5 0.003 
 (0.009) 
PctfemtopmXpctfemnonm 0.006 
 (0.021) 
Pctfemtopm_lag1Xpctfemnonm 0.018 
 (0.018) 
Pctfemtopm_lag2Xpctfemnonm -0.019 
 (0.017) 
Pctfemtopm_lag3Xpctfemnonm -0.003 
 (0.016) 
Pctfemtopm_lag4Xpctfemnonm 0.006 
 (0.015) 
Pctfemtopm_lag5Xpctfemnonm 0.009 
 (0.016) 
Constant 0.052*** 
 (0.017) 
Observations 121467 
Number of Firms 22885 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021 
Note: The model includes the full set of firm controls, year dummies and industry-specific trends as listed in the last column of Table 
2.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
 
Panel B:  Implied Marginal Effects  
                                          Implied Effect on Pctfemmidmanager at Different Values of Pctfemnonmanager 
Pctfemnonmanager =  0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 
Pctfemtopmanager 0.014 
0.010 
0.014* 
0.009 
0.016** 
0.007 
0.017*** 
0.006 
0.019** 
0.009 
0.019* 
0.012 
0.020 
0.013 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag1 0.015 
(0.008) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.005) 
0.028*** 
(0.007) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.032*** 
(0.010) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag2 0.029*** 
(0.008) 
0.028*** 
(0.007) 
0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.020*** 
(0.004) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag3 0.011 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag4 0.008 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.007) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.)004 
0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.013* 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
Pctfemtopmanager_lag5 0.003 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
Five-year Cumulative 
Effect 
0.080*** 
(0.020) 
0.081*** 
(0.018) 
0.083*** 
(0.014) 
0.088*** 
(0.013) 
0.092*** 
(0.018) 
0.095*** 
(0.024) 
0.095*** 
(0.025) 
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TABLE 6:  Percentage of Female Top Managers and Percentage of Female Middle Managers, Means By Race and Year  
 
 
PANEL A:  Percentage of Female Top Managers 
 
Year Pctfemtopmanagr Pctwhitefemtopmanagr Pctblkfemtopmanagr Pcthispfemtopmanagr Pctasianfemtopmanagr Pctindianfemtopmanaer 
1990 0.255 0.233 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.001 
1991 0.261 0.239 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.001 
1992 0.268 0.244 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.001 
1993 0.277 0.251 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.001 
1994 0.282 0.255 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.001 
1995 0.287 0.259 0.013 0.008 0.006 0.001 
1996 0.291 0.262 0.014 0.008 0.007 0.001 
1997 0.298 0.267 0.014 0.009 0.007 0.001 
1998 0.303 0.271 0.015 0.009 0.007 0.001 
1999 0.310 0.273 0.017 0.010 0.008 0.001 
2000 0.317 0.279 0.017 0.011 0.009 0.001 
2001 0.324 0.285 0.017 0.012 0.009 0.001 
2002 0.330 0.290 0.017 0.012 0.009 0.001 
2003 0.338 0.297 0.018 0.012 0.010 0.001 
Note: N = 315,530. 
 
 
 
PANEL B:  Percentage of Female Middle Managers 
 
Year Pctfemmidmanagr Pctwhitefemmidmanagr Pctblkfemmidmanagr Pcthispfemmidangr Pctasianfemmidmngr Pctindianfemmidmnger 
1990 0.283 0.252 0.015 0.010 0.004 0.001 
1991 0.291 0.258 0.017 0.010 0.005 0.001 
1992 0.299 0.266 0.017 0.010 0.005 0.001 
1993 0.302 0.269 0.017 0.010 0.005 0.001 
1994 0.305 0.270 0.018 0.011 0.005 0.001 
1995 0.309 0.269 0.021 0.012 0.005 0.001 
1996 0.313 0.274 0.020 0.012 0.006 0.001 
1997 0.317 0.275 0.021 0.013 0.006 0.001 
1998 0.320 0.277 0.022 0.013 0.006 0.001 
1999 0.327 0.281 0.024 0.015 0.007 0.002 
2000 0.334 0.285 0.025 0.016 0.007 0.002 
2001 0.337 0.286 0.026 0.017 0.008 0.001 
2002 0.342 0.289 0.027 0.017 0.007 0.001 
2003 0.348 0.295 0.026 0.018 0.008 0.002 
 
      Note: N = 315,530. 
 
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
        
 36 
Table 7:  Within-Race Relationships Between the Percentage of Female Middle Managers and Lagged Percentage of Female Top 
Managers (Fixed Effects Estimates) 
 
Panel A:  White Women 
 Dependent Variable: 
Pctwhitefemmidmanager 
Pctwhitefemtopmanager 0.004 
 (0.006) 
Pctwhitefemtopmanager_lag1 0.024*** 
 (0.005) 
Pctwhitefemtopmanager_lag2 0.027*** 
 (0.005) 
Pctwhitefemtopmanager_lag3 0.012*** 
 (0.005) 
Pctwhitefemtopmanager_lag4 0.005 
 (0.004) 
Pctwhitefemtopmanager_lag5 0.003 
 (0.005) 
Constant 0.088*** 
 (0.017) 
Observations 123050 
Number of Firms 23045 
Adjusted R-squared 0.012 
 
 
PANEL B: Black Women 
 Dependent Variable: 
Pctblkfemmidmanager 
Pctblkfemtopmanager -0.077*** 
 (0.026) 
Pctblkfemtopmanager_lag1 0.022* 
 (0.012) 
Pctblkfemtopmanager_lag2 0.011 
 (0.010) 
Pctblkfemtopmanager_lag3 0.005 
 (0.012) 
Pctblkfemtopmanager_lag4 0.002 
 (0.011) 
Pctblkfemtopmanager_lag5 0.034** 
 (0.014) 
Constant -0.020*** 
 (0.005) 
Observations 123050 
Number of Firms 23045 
Adjusted R-squared 0.036 
 
 
PANEL C:   Hispanic women 
 Dependent Variable: 
Pcthispfemmidmanager 
Pcthispfemtopmanager -0.059*** 
 (0.016) 
Pcthispfemtopmanager_lag1 0.007 
 (0.013) 
Pcthispfemtopmanager_lag2 0.027* 
 (0.016) 
Pcthispfemtopmanager_lag3 0.016 
 (0.012) 
Pcthispfemtopmanager_lag4 0.006 
 (0.016) 
Pcthispfemtopmanager_lag5 -0.005 
 (0.014) 
Constant -0.010** 
 (0.004) 
Observations 123050 
Number of Firms 23045 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022 
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PANEL D:  Asian Women 
 Dependent Variable: 
Pctasianfemmidmanager 
Pctasianfemtopmanager -0.044** 
 (0.018) 
Pctasianfemtopmanager_lag1 0.021 
 (0.013) 
Pctasianfemtopmanager_lag2 0.011 
 (0.010) 
Pctasianfemtopmanager_lag3 -0.002 
 (0.014) 
Pctasianfemtopmanager_lag4 0.011 
 (0.010) 
Pctasianfemtopmanager_lag5 0.016* 
 (0.009) 
Constant -0.003 
 (0.002) 
Observations 123050 
Number of Firms 23045 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005 
 
 
PANEL E:  Native American Women 
 Dependent Variable: Pctindianfemmidmanager 
Pctindianfemtopmanager 0.022 
 (0.060) 
Pctindianfemtopmanager_lag1 -0.006 
 (0.023) 
Pctindianfemtopmanager_lag2 0.032 
 (0.041) 
Pctindianfemtopmanager_lag3 0.006 
 (0.023) 
Pctindianfemtopmanager_lag4 -0.006 
 (0.030) 
Pctindianfemtopmanager_lag5 0.019 
 (0.020) 
Constant 0.002 
 (0.001) 
Observations 123050 
Number of Firms 23045 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 
Note: All models include the full set of firm controls and year dummies as listed in the last column of Table 2.  Robust standard errors 
in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
 
